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Case Summaries
CERCLA
OHM Remediation Services v.
Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., et
al., No. 96-30714, 1997 WL
370843 (5th Cir. July 22, 1997)
OHM, a remediation con-
tractor, brought action under the
Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) against numer-
ous named defendants for response
costs according to section 107(a)
and section 113(f), while claiming it
was not a potentially responsible
party (PRP). OHM Remediation
Services provided for the contain-
ment and/or clean-up ofhazardous
wastes. When Louisiana's Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) ordered Louisiana Oil to
take immediate action for a
hazardous substance spill, Louisi-
ana called upon the services of
OHM. Only a contractual
relationship existed between OHM
and Louisiana; OHM never had
any property interest in the
Louisiana Oil facility.
According to the DEQ,
OHM's work successfully abated
the emergency situation at the
facility and left the site in a secure
condition. Because the DEQ found
that Louisiana Oil's spilled materi-
als were hazardous wastes, it shut
down the facility. This order
effectively caused Louisiana Oil to
go out ofbusiness and its insurance
would not cover OHM's three
million dollar response cost bill.
OHM then sued Evans
Cooperage (which during a critical
two year period sent approximately
450,000 gallons of waste material
to Louisiana Oil for treatment/
disposal) for the recovery ofclean-
up costs under CERCLA section
107(a), 42 U.S.C. Section 9697(a).
Evans named several PRPs as
third-party defendants, those PRPs
in turn named more PRPs. One of
the named defendants was OHM
for ten drums of waste it had
delivered to Louisiana Oil in 1991.
OHM did not admit that the
material it sent to Louisiana Oil was
hazardous, nor that the materials
made it a PRP under the statute.
Instead, the company brought a
contribution action against the
defendants under CERCLA sec-
tion 113(f), 42 U.S.C. Section
9613(f).
The district court dis-
missed both OHM's section
107(a) and section 113(f) claims,
and OHM appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's rulings and
remanded the case. First, the Court
addressed OHM's section 107(a)
claim. The Court stated the
question was whether recovery of
response costs under section
107(a) is restricted to persons with
a "protectable interest" in the clean-
up site. The district court argued
that the word "causes" (from
section 107(a) language "[c]auses
the incurrence ofresponse costs")
implied a requirement that there be
a connection between the plaintiff
and the property. The connection
could onlybe satisfiedby an interest
CASE SUMMARIES
MELPR 39
in the site. This interpretation of
section 107(a) would bar OHM's
claim because as an independent
contractor it had no "protectable
interest" in the Louisiana property.
Contrary to the argument
employed by the district court, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that a
"protectable interest" in the clean-
up site was not a required element
of a section 107(a) claim. The
Court pointed out that such a
limitation cannot be fairly implied by
the text ofthe statute, by legislative
history, or by reading the statute as
a whole. Specifically, the Court
noted that nowhere does the statute
require a showing of a"protectable
interest." Moreover, the Court
concluded, such a reading of
section 107(a) would render the
nonsensical result of requiring even
the government to show it had a
protectable interest in any Superfund
site for which it incured response
costs before it could bring suit.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that
section 107(a) did not impose a
"protectable interest" limitation on
who may recover response costs,
and that OHM was not barred from
bringing its claim because it was an
independant contractor.
Second, the Court ad-
dressed OHM's section 113(f)
claim. In a claim for contribution,
the Court asked whether a
contribution action could be brought
by a party that was neither liable nor
potentially liable. The Court noted
that the legislative history of
CERCLA appears to limit section
113(f) claims to RPs and/or PRPs.
Specifically, section 113(a) was
not meant to be duplicative of
section 107(a), instead it was
meant to allow PRPs a cause of
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action to mitigate the harsh effects
ofjoint and several liability. The
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it
had, in dictum, suggested that
section 1 13(f) actions may only be
brought among PRPs. The Court
agreed with the analysis in United
Technologies v. BFI, 33 F.3d 96
(1 st Cir. 1994), holding that section
113(f) contribution actions may
only be brought by persons who are
liable or potentially liable under
CERCLA.
The Court briefly noted the
decision in Companies for Fair
Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853
F.Supp. 575 (D.Conn. 1994), a
case directly on point, which held
that the plain language in section
113(f) states that "any person" can
sue for contribution, therefore the
claimant need not be a PRP.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit
declined to adopt this reasoning.
Instead, the Court, while
adhering to the rule that only RPs
and PRPs may bring a section
113(f) action, broadly defined the
term "potentially responsible." Be-
cause the terms "liable or poten-
tially liable" and "potentially re-
sponsible party" have not been
defined by the statute, the Court,
from examining the text and the
structure of CERCLA, defined
"potentially responsible" as any
party being sued under the statute.
The Court reasoned that until a
defendant is cleared ofliability, he
is at least potentially liable. Thus,
under the Court's broad definition
of a PRP, OHM, which had not
been deemed liable under the
statute by a court and which
disputed its own liability, is
permitted to bring a section 1 13(f)
contribution action because it was
sued under CERCLA.
-Pang V Ly
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont
Mining Corp., No. 96-16334,
1997 WL 362462 (9th Cir. July
2,1996)
The Pinal Creek Group
commenced an action to recover all
or a portion of the voluntary
response costs it expended in the
cleanup of the Pinal Creek
Drainage Basin in Arizona. The
defendants, consisting of other
potentially responsible parties
("PRPs"), denied joint and several
liability and moved to dismiss.
After the district court denied the
motion to dismiss, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit granted the defendant's
petition for interlocutory appeal.
Three mining companies
formed the Pinal Creek Group
("the Group") to coordinate the
cleanup efforts of the hazardous
waste site. The Group admitted
partial responsibility for a portion of
the cleanup costs, but sought full
recovery of those costs from the
defendants ("theNewmont PRPs").
The Group's theory was that since
CERCLA provided for joint and
several liability among all defen-
dants, the Newmont PRPs must
reimburse the Group for the
cleanup costs it had voluntarily
expended. Following reimburse-
ment, the Newmont PRPs would
be entitled to assert a contribution
claim against the Group for its
portion ofthe costs.
As this was a question of
law, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
interpretation of CERCLA de
novo. Section 107(a)ofCERCLA
provides in pertinent part that suits
are permitted against certain "statu-
torily defined 'responsible parties'
to recover costs incurred in
cleaning up hazardous waste
disposal sites". 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a). The Group argued that
this section authorized them to
imposejoint and several liability on
the Newimont PRPs and recover
the totality ofthe Group's response
costs.
The Court noted that
Congress amended CERCLA in
1986 to address the issue of
apportioning response costs among
PRPs. Prior to the amendment,
CERCLA did not explicitly recog-
nize a claim for contribution.
Congress, however, aware of the
utility ofclaims for contribution for
cleanup costs, amended CERCLA
by enacting § 113(f) to recognize
and regulate such claims. The
Newmont PRPs argued that the
combined effect of §§07 and 113
limited their liability to contribution.
The Ninth Circuit, consis-
tent with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and five
circuits, agreed with the Newmont
PRPs. The Court found that a claim
by one PRP against another must
necessarily correspond to that
party's equitable share ofthe total
liability. Had the Court permitted
the Group to recover its full costs,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the
Group would have enjoyed two
unfair advantages: (1) it would
avoid the delay and burden of
arguing for the equitable allocation
of costs among the PRPs under §
113(f); and (2) it might avoid
bearing the cost of any "orphan
shares," which are costs attribut-




The Group advanced sev-
eral arguments against this proposi-
tion. First, the Group suggested
that the decision would discourage
CERCLA's policy of promoting
expeditious and voluntary environ-
mental responses to hazardous
waste sites. The Court rejected
that argument because the text,
structure, and legislative history of
§§ 107and I 13, aswell asjudicial
precedent, mandated the holding
regardless ofpolicy considerations.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that §
107 implicitly provided foraclaim
for contribution. Moreover, the
legislative history of § 113(f)
supported that conclusion by
confirmingthataclaim forcontribu-
tion could be made under § 107.
Essentially, § 107 provided the
right to make claims for contribu-
tion and § 113 provided the
mechanism for apportioning that
liability among responsible parties.
Second, the Group rea-
soned that the holding would
eliminatethe statute oflimitations on
a contribution claim by a PRP who
incurred voluntary response costs.
Section 1 13(g)(3) provides a three
year statute of limitations on
contribution actions, but the statute
is only triggered by events which
would follow coercive govern men-
tal intervention, such as a settle-
ment, consent decree, or judgment.
The Court, though, declined to
expound on that issue. The
decision limited itself to the
interpretation of the substantive
provisions ofCERCLA.
Third, the Group argued
that the only claim it could assert
against the Newmont PRPs was a
cost recovery claim for the totality
of its cleanup costs. The Group
suggested that, as a PRP, it had not
incurred the requisite liability to
authorize a contribution claim under
§ 113. It contended that the
government must incur response
costs before liability would exist
under § 107(a). The Court
rejected the argument for several
reasons. First, even the Newmont
PRPs acknowledged that the
Group had a contribution claim
against them. In addition, once the
Group incurred response costs, all
the PRPs, including the Group,
became partially responsible for
those costs. Finally, the argument
was inconsistent with the Group's
own position. Under the Group's
original theory, the Newmont PRPs
owed the Group the full response
costs, from which the Newmont
PRPs could then seek contribution.
The same premise that would
permit the Newmont PRPs' claim
for contribution against the Group
authorizes the Group's claim for
contribution against the Newmont
PRPs.
The Ninth Circuit found
that CERCLA's claim for contribu-
tion creates only several liability,
notjoint liability, among PRPs. The
opinion stated that the Group's
theory was unsupported by
CERCLA's provisions, would
create procedural turmoil, and ran
afoul of the traditional doctrine of
contribution. Thus, the Court held
that a PRP does not have a claim
under CERCLA forthe totality of
its cleanup costs against other
PRPs. Further, PRPs cannot be
foundjointly and severally liable to





Ben Oehrleins and Sons and
Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin
County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.
1997)
In 1980, Minnesota en-
acted the Minnesota Waste Man-
agement Act to protect public
health and the environment by
creating an "integrated waste
management system" in the state.
Minn. Stat. Section 115A.02(a)
and (b). The Act sought to reduce
the amount of waste generated and
disposed of, and to improve
recycling, composting, resource
recovery, and land disposal. The
Act allowed counties to develop
their own designation plans for
transfer or disposal facilities.
Accordingly, Hennepin County
created a waste management plan
and eventually enacted a "flow-
control"regulation, Ordinance 12,
to implement the plan.
The Ordinance, which took
effect in 1989, required that all
designated waste be delivered
exclusively to transfer stations or
processing facilities designated by
Hennepin County. In 1993, the
county suspended enforcement of
the regulation against waste des-
tined for disposal outside of
Minnesota, but still required all in-
state waste to go to the county-
designated facilities. Conse-
quently, in 1994, the Oehrleins
plaintiffs, which included eight
Minnesota waste haulers, one
Minnesota landfill, and one Iowa
landfill, filed suit in federal district
court. In 1995, a certified class of
residential and commercial "waste
generators" from Hennepin County
also filed suit. both the Oehrleins
MELPR 41
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and Robinson Rubber plaintiffs
alleged that Ordinance 12 violated
the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. In
addition to damages, the plaintiffs
sought an injunction against en-
forcement ofthe Ordinance.
The district court held that
the Ordinance, as it was enforced
subsequent to the suspension of
enforcement against out-of-state
waste deliveries, discriminated
against interstate commerce in
violation ofthe Commerce Clause.
The court granted summaryj udg-
ment to both sets ofplaintiffs. It was
from that decision that the instant
appeal was taken.
The County's principal
arguments on appeal were that the
Tax Inj unction Action, 28 U.S.C.
Section 1341, did not confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts
to enjoin the Ordinance, that neither
set of plaintiffs had standing, and
that the Ordinance did not violate
the Commerce Clause.
The Eighth CircuitCourt of
Appeals quickly concluded that the
Oehrleins plaintiffs did meet the
three minimal constitutional re-
quirements to demonstrate stand-
ing. First, the Court stated, the
Oehrleins plaintiffs had suffered an
actual or imminent injury in fact
because haulers had been sub-
jected to penalties for non-
compliance and because proces-
sors had been prohibited from
participating in the market. Sec-
ond, -the Court found that these
injunies were traceable to the
enactment and enforcement of
Ordinance 12. Third, the Court
concluded that a decision holding
Ordinance 12 to be unconstitu-
tional would redress those injuries
by allowing for recovery or
damages and enjoining further
enforcement. Finally, the Court
could find no prudential concerns
that would bar the Oehrleins
plaintiffs standing.
As for the Robinson Rub-
ber plaintiffs, the Court concluded
that prudential considerations of
third -party standingbarred stand-
ing. The Court found that the
Robinson Rubber plaintiffs had in
fact suffered an economic injury
when they were charged hi gher fees
for waste processing, which the
Court concluded were the direct
result of the enforcement of
Ordinance 12. Additionally, the
injuries alleged by the Robinson
Rubber plaintiffs would be re-
dressed by recovery of damages
and an injunction against enforce-
ment. Having satisfied the constitu-
tional minimum for standing, the
Court considered any prudential
limitations.
The Court first statedthat it
knew of no Commerce Clause
cases where a court had granted
standing to consumers whose
alleged harm was the passed-on
costs incurred by the regulated
entity. Further, the Court decided
that the Robinson Rubber plaintiffs'
claims fell within the doctrine of
third party standing, which usually
bars parties from asserting the
rights or legal interests ofothers in
order to obtain relief from injury
themselves. The Robinson Rubber
plaintiffs, according to the Court,
could not claim any personal right
under the Commerce Clause to
lower garbage bills, and any relief
due to them turned on the rights of
the waste haulers to be free from
enforcement ofthe Ordinance. The
Court could find no reason to relax
the third-party bar in this situation.
Additionally, the Court found that
the Robinson Rubber plaintiffs did
not fall within the zone of interests
doctrine, which requires that
whatever interest is sought to be
protected by the complaining party
is within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the
challenged statute or regulation.
Next the Court addressed
the County's argument that the Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341,
deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction in this case. In rejecting
the argument, the Court pointed out
that whether or not the Ordinance
constitutes a tax is a matter of
federal law, and that the purpose of
the Ordinance was clearly regula-
tory rather than revenue-raising.
The Court concluded that it did
have jurisdiction to decide the
matter before it.
Finally, the Court exam-
ined the County's argument that the
Ordinance did not violate the
Commerce Clause. It did so
separately, considering whether
purely intrastate enforcement ofthe
Ordinance was different from full
enforcement. The Court found that
the interstate enforcement of the
Ordinance could not survive rigor-
ous scrutiny, since the purpose of
the Ordinance was to grant an
absolute preference to a particular
local interest at the expense of all
others. Therefore, the Court
concluded, interstate enforcement
of the Ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause.
Next the Court considered
whether the County could enforce
flow control restrictions to waste
that stayed within the state. The
42 MELPR
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Court found that there was no
differential treatment ofin-state and
out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and
burdens the latter. Conceding that
this might create a local monopoly,
the Court still concluded that this
did not constitute discrimination
against interstate commerce. The
plaintiffs argued that interstate
commerce meant more than just
goods crossing state lines, and the
Court agreed that even a regulation
that does not discriminate may
constitute an unconstitutional bur-
den on interstate commerce and so
must withstand abalancing test.
The Eighth Circuit heldthat
with regard to the Oehrleins
plaintiffs, the provisions of the
Ordinance preventing the delivery
ofout-of-state waste was unconsti-
tutional. Further, the Court found
the provisions ofthe Ordinance that
restrict intrastate delivery did not
discriminate against interstate com-
merce. The Court remanded the
case fora determination ofwhether
the benefits of the intrastate
enforcement of the Ordinance were
clearly outweighed by the burdens
on interstate commerce.
-Laura Krasser
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 117 S.Ct.
1659 (1997)
Petitioner Bernadine
Suitum was the owner of an
undeveloped lot near the Nevada
shore ofLake Tahoe. Respondent
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
("the Agency"), which regulates
land use in the region, determined
that Suitum's property was ineli-
gible for development but was
entitled to receive certain allegedly
valuable "Transferable Develop-
ment Rights"(TDRs) that could be
sold to other landowners with the
agency'sapproval. Switumbrought
an action for compensation under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming
that the Agency's determinations
amounted to a taking of her
property without just compensa-
tion, a violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The District Court heldthat
Suitum's claim was not ripe for
adjudication as she had not
attempted to sell her TDRs.
Because the specific values ofthe
TDRs were unknown, the court
could not realistically assess whether
the Agency's regulations had
frustrated Suitum's reasonable
expectations. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, noting that action
on a TDR transfer application
would be the requisite "final
decision" by the agency regarding
its regulations' application to
Suitum's lot. Appeal was then
taken to the United States Supreme
Court.
The sole question before
the Court was whether the claim
was ripe for adjudication, even
though Suitum had not attempted to
sell the development rights she had
or was eligible to receive. The
Court held that Suitum's regulatory
taking claim was ripe for adjudica-
tion. First, the Court recognized
that Suitum must satisfy the
prudential ripeness principle re-
quiring that she receive a "final
decision" from the agency regard-
ing the application ofits regulations
to her property. The Court stated
that the Ninth Circuit's rationale for
holding Suitum's claim unripe-that
she had not obtained a final and
authoritative agency decision--was
unsupported by the United States
Supreme Court's precedents,
which make clear two points
regarding the finality requirement:
(i) it applies to decisions about how
a taking plaintiff s particular parcel
may be used, and (ii) it responds to
the high degree of discretion
characteristically possessed by
land use boards in softening the
stricture ofthe general regulations
they administer. The Court
maintained that Suitum's claim
satisfied the demand for finality.
The Court recognized that it was
undisputed that the Agency had
finally determined that her land lies
entirely within a zone in which
development was not permitted.
As the Agency had no discretion to
exercise over Suitum's right to use
her land, the Court reasoned, no
occasion existed for applying the
requirement that a landowner take
steps to obtain a final decision
about the use that would be
permitted on the particular parcel.
The Court foundno merit in
theAgency'sargumentthatSuitwn's
case was not ripe because no
values attributable to her TDRs
were known. First, little or no
uncertainty remained, as to Suitum's
rightto recieive TDRs that she may
later sell. Second, as to her right to
transfer her TDRs, the only
contingency apart from market
demand was the right ofthe Agency
or a local regulatory body to deny
approval for a specific transfer
based on the buyer's intended
improper use of the TDRs. The
Court pointed out that as the
Agency did not deny that there are
many potential lawful buyers who
MELPR 43
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would unquestionably be ap-
proved, the TDRs' valuation is but
an issue of fact about possible
market prices, on which the District
Court had considerable evidence.
The Court recognized that similar
determinations are routinely made
by courts without the benefit of a
market transaction in the subject
property.
Finally, the Court rejected
theAgency'sargument thatSuitum's
claim was unripe under the "fitness
for review" requirement ofAbbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 87
S.Ct. 1507. The Court maintained
that Abbott Laboratories was not
on point because the petitioners
there were challenging the validity
ofa regulation as beyond the scope
of its issuing agency's authority,
whereas Suitum sought to be paid
for the consequences of the
regulations as issue, not to invali-
date them. Thus, the Court, finding
that Suitum had received a "final
decision" consitent with the ripe-
ness requirement, vacated the
judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals
and remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion.
-Melissa McAllister
TSCA
Sierra Club v. United States
Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 96-70223, 1997
WL 367396 (9th Cir. July 7,
1997)
- At issue in this case was
the authority ofthe Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to
promulgate a final rule allowing for
the importation ofpolychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) into the United
States for purposes ofdisposal.
Section 6(e) of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA)
concerns regulation ofPCBs. The
statute prohibits the manufacture,
processing, and distribution in
commerce ofPCBs. The statute
contains an exception to this
broad ban, allowing the EPA
Administrator to grant an exemp-
tion on an individual basis,
provided that (1) the administra-
tor finds "an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or environment
would not result"; (2) the
exemption does not last for more
than one year; and (3) the party
seeking the exemption first makes
a good faith effort to develop a
substitute chemical. The statute
also instructs EPA to promulgate
regulations to "prescribe methods
for the disposal" of PCBs
consistent with the prohibitions set
forth in the statute.
Pursuant to its TSCA §
6(e)( I) authority to regulate the
disposal of PCBs, EPA held a
notice and comment rulemaking
process, and on March 18, 1996,
promulgatedthe final rulethat was
at issue in this case (now codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 761.93 (1997)).
Under this "Import for Disposal
Rule," "it is no longer necessary
for persons who wish to import
PCBs for disposal in accordance
with this rule to apply for case-by-
case exemptions under section
6(eX3)." Rather, importers must
submit notice to the EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance at least 45 days before
the date they intend to bring PCBs
into the United States. According
to the new rule, if notice is
provided in atimely and complete
manner once per year, a party
may "continue importing indefinitely
without interruption." The Sierra
Club petitioned the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to review the Import for
Disposal Rule under 15 U.S.C. §
2618(a)(I )(B), asserting that the
rule violated the import ban
contained in TSCA § 6(e)(3)(A).
On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit first addressed whether the
petitioner, Sierra Club, was re-
quired, under Fed. R. App. Pro.
15(c), to serve notice ofits petition
for review on all ofthe commenters
and witnesses of the informal
rulemaking proceeding that pre-
ceded the promulgation of EPA's
rule. Sierra Club moved for leave to
dispense with the service require-
ment with regard to the three
hundred and seventeen groups,
individuals, and organizations that
provided EPA with comments and
input during the administrative
rulemaking process. A motions
panel of the Ninth Circuit had
previously denied Sierra Club's
motion "without prejudice to
renewal in theopeningbrief." Sierra
Club renewed its motion for leave to
dispense with the service require-
ment in its appellate brief, asserting
that the FRAP 15(c) requirements
should not apply to this case, where
the rulemaking proceeding was
informal and where so many
different parties provided com-
ments and input to the agency. The
Ninth Circuit agreed and granted
the motion, recognizing that the
facts and procedural circumstances
ofthe case did not bring the rule's
service requirements into play.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether EPA's rule
allowing importation ofPCBs for
44 MELPR
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disposal violated the statutory
prohibitions concerning PCBs
contained in § 6(e)(3)(A)(1) ofthe
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2618.
Looking to the text ofthe statutes
to decide if congressional intent
was clear, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the absolute ban on manufac-
turing PCBs contained in TSCA §
6(e) includes an absolute ban on
their import. As such, the Court
stated, EPA may not promulgate a
rule governing the disposal of
PCBs that would violate this
categorical ban. While the court
recognized the lone exception to
TSCA's ban on the manufacture
and import ofPCBs, which allows
the EPA Administrator to grant an
exemption, under certain circum-
stances, for no more than one year,
it pointed out that the EPA,
however, may not promulgate a
rule to dispose of PCBs which
allows parties to "continue import-
ing [PCBs] indefinitely without
interruption," as it did here.
The Court also observed
that the Import for Disposal Rule
attempted to obviate the TSCA's
requirements with respect to
granting an exception to the import
and manufacture ban. The Court
held that such actions were
impermissible under any reading of
TSCA. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
held that EPA lacked the statutory
authority to promulgate the Import
for Disposal Rule, as it was a
violation ofthe PCB manufacture
ban contained in TSCA § 6 and
contrary to the clear intent of




Newton County Widlife Asso-
ciation v. United States Forest
Service, 113F.3d 110, (8th Cir.
1997)
The Newton County
Wildlife Association, the Sierra
Club and various individuals
brought an action against the
United States Forest Service for
violating the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act (WSRA), 16 U.S.C.
Sections 1271 et seq., and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA), 16 U.S.C. Sections
703 et seq., by approving timber
sales prior to completing plans for
a comprehensive management
plan as mandated by Section
1271(d)(1) of the WSRA. The
WSRA authorizes particular gov-
ernment entities to designate
portions ofrivers which have high
environmental or cultural value as
"components ofthe national wild
and scenic river system." 16
U.S.C. Sections 1271, 1274.
The authorized agency must
designate the boundaries of the
land and within three years after
the designation is made, imple-
ment a plan which addresses
resource protection, develop-
ment of lands and facilities, and
other management practices nec-
essary to achieve the purpose of
the WSRA.
In 1992 Congress desig-
nated portions ofsix rivers located
in the Ozark National Forest. The
Forest Service did not meet its
deadline for completing the
comprehensive management plan,
but did conduct four separate
timber sales which were at issue in
this case. On appeal, the
appellants sought to enjoin the
Forest Service from selling the
timber until the agency completed
its management plan. The Eighth
Circuit afirmed the district court's
holding that the WSRA was not
violated because the WSRA did
not mandate completion of the
management plan prior to imple-
menting timber sales. The Court
also indicated that because the
plan was not a precondition to
approving timber sales, it could
not enjoin the Forest Service's
sale oftimber. Such an injunction
was also found to be inappropri-
ate because the Court agreed with
the Forest Service's contention
that the four timber sales were
outside of WSRA designated
territory. Since the Forest Service
did not have to provide a
management plan for areas that
were not in the designated
territory, the Eighth Circuit found
that failure to provide a plan for
timber sales outside of the area
cannot be grounds for an
njunction
The appellants also ar-
gued that the sale of the timber
priorto implementingthe manage-
ment plan violated the MBTA.
The Court noted that the MBTA
did not provide a private right of
action, but the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA), 16
U.S.C. Sections 1600 et seq.,
did. The appellants claimed that
because the MBTA makes it
illegal to kill, posses, pursue, hunt
or harm migratory birdsin various
other ways, the Forest Service's
sale of timber, which would
inevitably harm the migratory bird
population in the harvested area,
MELPR 45
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violated the MBTA and the Forest
Service should be enjoined. The
court stated that it would stretch
the bounds of reason to make any
conduct which may indirectly harm
migratory birds absolutely prohib-
ited. The Court construed the
language which prohibits the
"taking" and "killing" to mean
"physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was
undoubtedly a concern at the time
of the statute's enactment in
1918."
Further, the Court held
that the MBTA does not apply to
actions of federal agencies. By its
terms the statute's sanctions apply
to "any person, association, part-
nership, or corporation". 16
U.S.C. Section 707(a). The court
rationalized that because, in
common usage, the word "person"
did not include the government,
statutes were construed to exclude
the government. In response to the
appellant's argument that the
MBTA must apply to the govern-
ment if the nation is to meet its
obligations under the 1916 treaty
with Great Britain which gave rise
to the MBTA, the Court stated that
the government's duty arose from
the treaty itself, but the statute
extended only to "persons".
The Court noted that its
conclusions regarding the MBTA
were tentative because it lacked
the expertise and knowledge ofthe
Fish and Wildlife Service, the
agency charged with administering
that statute. In its conclusion, the
Court committed the enforcement
ofthese environmental policies to
agency discretion, not judicial
review. For those reasons, the
Court affirmed the district court's
decision which refused to enjoin
the sale ofthe timber.
-Rachel M Craig
MISCELLANEOUS
Lindsay Manufacturing Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity, No. 96-1282, 96-1440,
1997 WL 369989 (8th Cir. July 8,
1997)
Lindsay Manufacturing
Company (Lindsay) appealed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment to Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Company and the
Hartford Insurance Company of
Illinois (collectively referred to
hereinafter as Hartford) on
Lindsay's claim and Hartford's
restitution counterclaim arising out





acid solution known as "pickle
liquor." When the pickle liquor was
no longer effective, it was disposed
of into an open, unlined, clay-
bottomed earthen waste pit. In
May of 1980, Lindsay was notified
by the EPA ofpotential contamina-
tion problems. In response,
Lindsay installed a monitoring well
in June of 1980 to collect and test
the water samples. On December
16, 1982, contamination of the
aquifer was detected in one ofthe
wells. Lindsay then entered into
several stipulation agreements with
the Nebraska Department of
Environmental Control (NDEC).
By October 1, 1983, the waste pit
was certified closed. Lindsay
retained an independent engineer-
ing firm to investigate and develop a
plan for cleaning the site. The firm
concluded the contamination oc-
curred when the monitoring wel Is
were drilled in December 1982.
Although Lindsay began its
investigations in 1980, it did not
notify Hartford of the contamina-
tion until October4, 1985. Lindsay
claimed the expenses incurred in
the clean-up ofthe site constituted
damages under its primary and
umbrella policies with Hartford.
The comprehensive gen-
eral liability (CGL) policies obli-
gated Hartford to pay all sums
which the insured becomes obli-
gated to pay "as damages" caused
by an occurrence. The policies
contained a "pollution exclusion"
which excluded from coverage
payments that were "damages," but
were not the result ofenvironmental
contamination that was "sudden
and accidental." The policies
covered the period from January 1,
1982, to January 1, 1983.
Hartford negotiated a writ-
ten agreement with Lindsay to pay
the expenses incurred in the clean-
up. In subsequent investigation,
Hartford discovered that a NDEC
government geologist concluded
that the contamination was a result
ofseepageratherthanthedrillingof
the monitoring wells. Nonetheless,
Hartford continued to make the
payments as required by the CGL
policies.
Over time, Hartford ac-
cepted that the cause of the
contamination was not a "sudden
and accidental" occurrence, but
rather a gradual seepage. Because
the clean-up costs were a result of
seepage, which was not covered by
the policy, Hartford ceased making
payments. Lindsay then brought
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action against Hartford based on:
(1)breach ofthe CGL policies; (2)
breach of the separate agreement
to reimburse Lindsay for all
expenses resulting from the clean-
up; and (3) an equitable estoppel
theory which required Hartford to
continue making payments.
The district court granted
summaryjudgment to Hartford and
Lindsay appealed.
The Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling and
remanded the case. The primary
disagreement between Lindsay and
Hartford was the phrase "as
damages," contained in the policy
language. Since Nebraska state
law governed the scope ofthe term
"as damages" and the Nebraska
Supreme Court had not reached its
conclusion, the Court attempted to
predict how the Nebraska Su-
preme Court would address the
issue.
The Court found most
persuasive decisions of the Su-
preme Court ofNebraska indicat-
ing that it would: (1) find the term
"damages" ambiguous in lay under-
standing and (2) would not take the
second step of applying the
"insurance context" to give it
technical meaning. The Court
specifically looked at Sandy Creek
Public Schools v. St. Paul
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 384
N.W.2d 279 (Neb. 1986), and
Katskee v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, 515 N.W.2d 645 (Neb.
1994). The Nebraska Supreme
Court in both cases adopted a lay
person's understanding in the
construction of a term. Based on
this demonstrated preference, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that
although the term "as damages" had
a particular meaning in a insurance
community, such would not be
employed ifthe term could be fairly
interpreted in more than one way.
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the
term "as damages" to include both
legal damages and equitable relief
because that interpretation favored
the insured. Accordingly,the Court
foundthatthe term "as damages" in
a CGL policy covered environ-
mental response costs and that
Lindsay had a policy claim against




Inc. v. Lincoln Township of
Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d
234 (Mo. 1997)
In April, 1994, Plaintiff,
Premium Standard Farms, Inc.
("Premium"), a Missouri corpo-
ration engaged primarily in hog
farming, purchased 3084 acres of
farmland in Lincoln Township of
Putnam County, which it amed
White Tail Farm. Premium
erected 96 hog barns and 12 hog
waste lagoons on 12 separate
sites containing one lagoon and 8
barns each. Each hog barn was
designed to allow hog manure to
fall through the floor into a shallow
holding area. Every two hours
water flushes the waste into an
adjacent lagoon. The lagoons
store and break down the hog
waste. Each lagoon is equipped
with intake pipes for receiving the
waste from the hog barns and exit
pipes through which water is
pumped to fertilize Premium's hay
fields.
In June, 1994, Defendant
Lincoln Township adopted "Com-
prehensive Plan and Zoning
Regulations for Lincoln Town-
ship." Under the regulations, the
land owned by Premium was
zoned A-1 (Agricultural). The
regulations permitted livestock
sewage lagoons systems (unde-
fined) and livestock feedlots
(defined as 100 cattle per acre,
1000 hogs per acre, 1000 sheep
per acre, 1000 poultry per acre).
In addition, the regulations re-
quired cash or surety bonds to
guarantee proper closure and
post-closure care of sewage
lagoons and minimum setbacks of
5,280 feet from adjacent resi-
dences or dwellings for lagoon
systems with capacities oftwenty
acre feet or more. Further, the
regulations imposed a bonding
requirement of over $750,000
per lagoon, totaling over
$9,000,000. The regulations also
required minimum setbacks of
1,400 feet from adjacent resi-
dences or dwellings for livestock
feedlots.
In mid-July, 1994, the
code enforcement officer for
Lincoln Township sent a letter to
Premium remindingPremium of
the procedures set forth in the
1994 regulations. In Septem-
ber, 1994, an inspection of
Premium's property was made by
the code enforcement officer,
who observed 72 feedlots and
nine lagoons. The lagoons were
located closer than 5,280 feet
from adjacent residences or
dwellings.
In late July, 1994, Pre-
mium brought an action for
declaratoryjudgment and injunc-
tion against Lincoln Township to
prevent enforcement ofits regula-
MELPR 47
Vol. 5 No. I
tions. Lincoln Township counter-
claimed for enforcement of its
regulations and for reliefbased on
the theory of public nuisance.
Premium filed three motions for
summaryjudgment, which the trial
court entered in favor of Pre-
mium, at the same time dismissing
Lincoln Township's counterclaims.
While numerous issues were
raised by the parties on appeal to
the Missouri Supreme Court, the
Court primarily addressed two
issues: (i) whether Lincoln
Township's actions imposing set-
back and bonding requirements
on Premium Standard Farms
livestock sewage lagoons and
setbacks on its finishing buildings
exceeded the township's statuto-
rily granted zoningpowers and(ii)
whether Lincoln Township had
the power to commence a public
nuisance action.
As a threshold matter, the
Missouri Supreme Court ad-
dressed Lincoln Township's chal-
lenge of its and the trial court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate the
issues presented. Lincoln Town-
ship claimed Premium had failed
to exhaust its administrative
remedies because it failed to
pursue an appeal for a variance
permit to the Lincoln Township
Board of Zoning Adjustment
before seeking review by the
courts. The Supreme Court
reasoned that because the issue
presented in the instant case was
not in any way dependent upon
further development ofthe record
through administrative proce-
dures, as the case involved a legal
issue, the doctrine ofexhaustion of
administrative remedies did not
apply.
The Supreme Court then




regulation of its finishing buildings
and sewage lagoons, asserting
they were "farm buildings" and/or
"farm structures" exempt from the
township's general zoning power.
The Court examined the language
of the statutes which Lincoln
Township claimed to have been
granted its powers (specifically §§
65.260,65.270,65.677,65.697,
ofthe Revised Missouri Statutes,
as amended). The Court stated
that a plain reading of § 65.677
revealed no ambiguity, as Lincoln
Township contended. The Court
maintained that while the statute
generally granted the township
power to restrict certain "areas for
agricultural, forestry, and recre-
ation" uses, it did not authorize the
regulation ofagricultural uses, as
Lincoln Township contended.
The Supreme Court held that the
livestock sewage lagoons and the
livestock finishing buildings at
issue in the instant case were "farm
structures" within the meaningof §
65.677 and that setback and
bonding requirements were not
authorized and, thus, were imper-
missible. As there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to the
nature and composition of the
lagoons and finishing buildings, the
Court held that Premium was
entitled toj udgment as a matter of
law.
Finally, the Missouri Su-
preme Court addressed whether
Lincoln Township had been
granted express power to bring a
public nuisance action or, in the
alternative, whether the power to
prosecute a nuisance action is
necessary to the exercise of some
express township power. The
Court stated that no express
authority to prosecute a nuisance
action had been granted townships.
The Court further recognized that
the power to prosecute a public
nuisance action was neither implied
in nor incident to the exercise ofthe
powers expressly granted to town-
ships in chapter 65 of the Revised
Missouri Statutes. Thus, the Court,
affirming the trial court'sjudgment,
found that Lincoln Township's
counterclaim seeking injunction of
Premium's operations was prop-
erly dismissed, as the township did




Gunn v. U.S. Dep't of Agricul-
ture., No. 96-3995S], 1997 WL
367337 (8th Cir. July 7, 1997)
Charles Gunn, an Iowa
farmer, challenged a determination
by the Soil Conservation Service
(SCS) that 160 acres of Gunn's
farmland were converted wetlands,
and therefore, could not be farmed
without his losing eligibility for
certain federal farm-assistance
programs. The SCS made its
determination pursuant to 16
U.S.C. §§ 3108, 3821-24, com-
monly known as the "Swampbuster"
law. The purpose of the
Swampbuster law is to preserve
wetlands throughout the United
States by discouraging their con-
version into crop lands. Under
Swampbuster, a farmer's eligibility
for federal benefits is forfeited ifhe
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or she elects to farm upon a land
declared a converted wetland.
The 160-acre tract of land
in question had been farmed by
Gunn and his predecessors since
1906. Prior to 1906, the land was
a wetland and was not arable. In
1906, in an effort to achieve
increased production, the local
drainage district inserted tiles under
the land for the purpose ofdraining
excess water. As a result, some of
Gunn's land became generally
productive and suitable for farming.
However, due to neighboring
drainage, a significant portion of
Gunn's land remained wet and was
not agriculturally productive.
In 1985, Congress passed
the Swampbuster law which, in
essence, denied federal farm-
assistance benefits to farmers who
produced an agricultural commod-
ity on a "converted wetland." A
converted wetland is generally
defined as a wetland that has been
manipulated in any way so that
agricultural production is possible.
One exemption to the statute is
noteworthy: no farmer is ineligible
for benefits if his or her land has
been converted from wetland to
arable land before December 23,
1985. In 1991, when Gunn sought
certification for federal benefit
programs, the SCS determined that
32.9 acres of Gunn's land were
"farmed wetlands," which are
wetlands that are sometimes dry
enough to farm. At that time, the
SCS advised Gunn that he could
continue to farm the 32.9 acres and
maintain the 1906 drainage system
without losing his benefits because
the land was not considered a
converted wetland and because the
drainage system was in place
before December 23, 1985.
However, the SCS also warned
that any improvements to the
drainage system would cause him
to forfeit his benefits if he
subsequently chose to make the
landproductive.
In 1992, considering the
significant drainage problems that
still existedon some ofGunn's land,
the local drainage district installed
new drainage tiles and dug an open
ditch on the land. This cured most,
but not all of the shortcomings ofthe
1906 system. However, when
Gunn applied for certification ofhis
eligibility for benefits in 1992, the
SCS found that the new system had
a greater drainage capacity and had
completely drained the land. The
SCS determined that 28.2 acres of
Gunn's land now qualified as
converted wetland and that, under
the Swampbuster law, Gunn would
lose his federal benefits ifhe elected
to farm the land.
Gunn sued in Iowa District
Court challenging the SCS's
decision that the 28.2 acres were
converted farmland. After the
District Court found against Gunn,
he raised a number of points on
appeal before the 8th Circuit. First,
Gunn argued that regulations
promulgated by the SCS to refine
the scope of the Swampbuster
statute were not consistent with the
act. The Eighth Circuit considered
Gunn's argument that the SCS's
definition of"converted wetland"
was inconsistent with the meaning
Congress intendedforthe term, but
found the challenge without merit.
Moreover, Gunn could not con-
vince the Eighth Circuit that the
conversion of wetlands in this
particular instance was in fact a
process that "commenced" in
1906, thereby falling under the
December 23, 1985 exemption.
Gunn pointed to specific statutory
language as well as a plain meaning
argument that the conversion
process had commenced before
the statutory cutoff, but the court
found the 1906 system and the
1992 system to be mutually
exclusive undertakings, and further,
that significant wetland characteris-
tics had vanished after the imple-
mentation of the 1992 system.
Thus, the 1992 system was found
to have been commenced after
1985. The Court, however, noted
that had Gunn demonstrated that
the 1992 system was the culmina-
tion of one actively pursued
conversion, or at least one that had
commenced prior to 1985, his
argument would have been war-
ranted.
The Eighth Circuit was
careful to point out that the general
purpose of the Swampbuster
statute, to preserve the wetlands as
they existed in 1985, would be
defeated by a ruling in Gunn's
favor. The land in question
continued to have significant wet-
land characteristics prior to the
installation ofthe 1992 system and
part of Congress' purpose was to
preserve those characteristics. The
Court decided that this purpose
was certainly not accomplished by
the drainage work done on the land
in 1992, and that no argument made
by Gunn could convince the Court
that the 1992 work was exempt
from the statute. Gunn's further
argument that the changes in 1992
were attributable to the local
drainage district was found by the
Court to be without a sound legal
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basis and was subsequently re-
jected.
Another argument put be-
fore the Eighth Circuit by Gunn, that
the SCS failed to follow its own
regulations in determiningthat the
land was wetland prior to 1992,
was also rejected by the Court.
Gunn argued that the land should
have been classified as "converted
wetland" prior to 1992, and not
"farmed wetland." However, the
Eighth Circuit found that the
regulation put forth to support
Gunn's claim applied only to
converted wetland. The Court held
that Gunn's land was not converted
wetland before 1992 because ofits
wetland characteristics, and that
any determination by the SCS
before 1992 was sound.
A final claim madeby Gunn
in his original petition sought
compensation for a taking ofland
by inverse condemnation under the
Fifth Amendment. This claim was
rejected by the District Court
because the United States Court of
Federal Claims had exclusive
jurisdiction over the claim because
Gunn sought damages which
exceeded $10,000. On appeal,
Gunn asserted that the District
Court erred in not transferring the
case to the Federal Claims Court.
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the
decision to transfer was discretion-
ary with the District Court, and that
becausethere was no barto Gunn's
filing a separate action in the
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